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Let me state from the outset that I would never presume to suggest I know anything about the Middle East, or Egypt in particular. But I am particularly sensitive to a need to be humble about the state of affairs in highly complex societies and I also think we need to be cautious about rushing out to assess the merits or deficiencies of "democracy promotion" without considering the context of a policy.
Let's start by challenging Lexington's claim that "Mr Bush was indeed a far more active champion of democracy than Mr Obama has been." Is that true? Lexington suggests that Bush "nagged, scolded, bribed and bullied its allies towards greater democracy." and provides as evidence that "The Americans leant on Egypt to hold more open elections in 2005, and in 2006 they talked an astonished Israel into letting Hamas contest Palestinian elections in the occupied territories. Even the Saudis were prevailed on to hold some (men only) local elections". But let's deconstruct this. What were the constraints on the democracy promotion agenda? Even if the US nominally encouraged more "open elections", were they not, as their predecessors, simultaneously providing tremendous amounts of foreign assistance to President Mubarrak and gladly using the services of his intelligence apparatus to detain and torture terrorism suspects? Certainly Hamas did contest elections, and in fact prevailed in parliamentary elections in 2006, but the Bush administration responded by cutting aid programs to Palestians, not by celebrating the democratic process. This is not to suggest that the Bush administration should have forgone its strategic interests in Egypt or that they did not have the prerogative to use aid as leverage to persuade Hamas to moderate its positions. But to suggest that the "freedom agenda" took precedence at the cost of security, which was paramount in the administration, ignores reality, much in the same way that some suggest that the Bush administration changed course of aid programs, spending a greater proportion of development assistance in countries where the policies were more apt to encourage development. We know for a fact that this did not really happen. (Shameless self promotion.)
More After the Break:
I also take issue with Lexington's claim that President Obama "gave only tepid support to 2009’s “green revolution” in Iran, which the regime went on to crush." I ask, what was President Obama supposed to do in this circumstance? Naively suggesting that bold rhetoric from the White House podium would have led to a different outcome ignores the complexity of history of the United States interference in Iran. To align US interests with those of the people protesting the regime could have had unforseen, and negative consequences.
This all culminates in one important, and overlooked point: The protests in Egypt, Tunisia, and those in Iran, derive only so much from political grievances caused specifically by the head of government. Yes, the political systems, the entrenched dictatorships and kleptocracies do in fact influence the economic viability of the countries in question. But Mr. Muhammad Bouazizi, who set himself and the region ablaze with his astounding and violently poignant act of self sacrifice, and those who protest in his name, are protesting more than a lack of democratic representation. They protest against economic conditions, partly derived from institutional shortcomings, and largely derivative of the reality of the current economic malaise that has struck so much of the world, aggravated by inflation in those sectors that affect the poor most severely. They protest the reality that job creation is difficult in the best of circumstances, let alone when economic development is stagnant or slow. In fact,the World Bank and other indicators show that Egypt and Tunisia showed pretty good growth rates - but the bottom line is that unemployment for educated classes remains presumably below acceptable rates (the World Bank does not seem to have public data to support this, however.)
Free and fair elections will also only go so far to fix goverance problems, which can be entrenched at the very lowest levels of government services, many of which are rated below the 50th percentile.
So, the bottom line is that getting things right will be difficult, complex, and not guaranteed by any stretch of the imagination.As for the Economist's statement in the cover story, I agree wholeheartedly:
"If the West cannot back Egypt’s people in their quest to determine their own destiny, then its arguments for democracy and human rights elsewhere in the world stand for nothing."
I also agree that the Muslim Brotherhood is nothing to get spun up over as though the alternative of another strong man was the better security paradigm for the west. Let us not forget that Sayid Qutb and Ayman Zawahiri, and the movement they spawned was anti-western - but largely anti-western in the sense that their narrative depicted an illegitimate government striking a Faustian bargain with the west that would mortgage the future of Arabs for American interests. More Arabs and other Muslims probably were attracted to the Al Qaeda narrative because of the illegitimacy of Arab dictatorships and the failure of governance at home as any persuasive argument about American ideals or moral decay.
I do however, take issue with the article's closing comment: "The only certainty is that autocracy leads to upheaval, and the best guarantor of stability is democracy." Democracy should not be mistaken for the guarantor of stability or peace, and in fact the democratic peace theory has largely been debunked, replaced by the slightly more realistic if not more cynical Democratic Transition theory posited by Mansfield and Snyder.
I guess the long and short of it is this - elections don't make democracies - leaders don't always make institutions - democracy doesn't guarantee stability. Let's support the creation of a strong governance and democratic architecture that helps Egypt transition smoothly and realistically. The alternative is a set of unrealistic expectations and half-measures.
Ok, now I'm going to watch the Superbowl and gorge myself on wings.
Well-written and well-argued, good man. First one out of the gates is a winner.
ReplyDeleteNow, to your points. Fully agree with your last-para summary of the post. Just two additional points to make.
1. Be careful of citing GNP as a reliable economic indicator used to predict or factor into political stability. In fact, high GNP growth can actually portend the oppositie reaction: political INstability. In developing societies like Egypt (and China), the rich can get richer while the poor can stay about the same or only slightly less poor. Thus, the disenfranchised (and populous...and socially malleable...and scare) poor can protest, revolt, strike, whatever to call government attention to the inequalities. I think that's at least part of the problem in Egypt. And in both 1989, the Uighur protests in 2009, and other societal problems in China, that's exactly what China has dealt with. As a predictor of political stability (or at least a factor in determining it), I suggest stratifying the data across society classes, use median income, or other stats that take that into account.
2. Maybe you're not as bold to say it, but I will. Bush's Freedom Agenda was about providing a philosophical and moral pretext and justification for invading Iraq. Period. The Freedom Agenda byproducts in other societies like Afghanistan, Middle East, Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, etc. were either used to politically give credence to the underlying, more narrow purpose of the Freedom Agenda or were (as you say) ignored at times for the sake of other (legitimate in my view) policy factors like security, economics, or political stability.
That is an excellent point - in fact, I had originally tried to find the studies that argue that social unrest can correlate directly to a rise in per capita GNI or GNP. The China model is a fascinating case study.
ReplyDeleteWhat is really critical in your point, from my perspective, is the potential policy implications that the development of a middle class and the rise in income have on the utility of sanctions. Gary Shiffman, and others, have argued convincingly that the best thing you can do for entrenched dictators or "rogue" regimes is to support economic development and the creation of a middle class because doing so actually destabilizes autocracy. Certainly this is happening in China, Zimbabwe, Iran, and Cuba.
May be the subject of a great future post!
Either way, thanks for the comment. It's tough trying to write quickly and prolifically - I liken it to working out, painting, learning any new trade - Practice makes perfect!
Nah...the writing's great. Really.
ReplyDeleteSo does that mean we should actually pump $ into authoritarian economies? The state would just take the $ and run, especially since most authoriatarian states are also state-controlled economies. Schiffman's idea is interesting, and probably more useful in explaining the perils of sanctions. But it has just as mnay policy pitfalls. My own preference in how to deal with authoritarian states is to just be opportunistic and care less about it. Democracy is a great, aspirational idea that I fully support. But in the end, it's not a useful foreign policy tool. Better to just wait and see, be smart when openings and crises hit, and trust the ultimate democratic revolutionary: the average citizen (theirs not ours).
You should submit this to the Economist!
ReplyDelete